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Japan’s economic performance and economic policy actions since summer 2001 have 
once again been disappointing.  The economy slid into mild recession, its third in the past 
decade; and unemployment rose and deflation has persisted.  The economy bottomed out in early 
2002 and apparently began a moderately good recovery, but that now appears to be slowing, 
perhaps even stalling.  The prospects for 2003 are not good. 
Basically Japan’s mediocre economic performance continues.  Even more dismaying has 
been the persistence of the same major macro, financial, and structural problems that have 
plagued Japan for some years now – inadequate aggregate demand, huge non-performing loans, 
corporate excess capacity and low profitability, unemployment, slowness to engage in substantial 
structural reforms, and so on. 
Perhaps the greatest disappointment has been in the hope that Prime Minister Koizumi 
would successfully address these and other major economic issues.  While the Koizumi 
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government has made modest progress in some structural reforms, such as public corporations 
and the postal service system, the overall results have been disappointingly limited.   
Nonetheless, Japan is very different than it was a decade ago – institutionally, politically, 
and even in its mindset.  My colleague Gerald Curtis has characterized the 1990s not as the lost 
decade but as the watershed decade, in which the cumulative effect of many changes, some 
seemingly small, will be profound over the longer run. 
However, the economic cost of the 1990s has been substantial in terms of gross domestic 
product (GDP) foregone.  If the economy had grown over the past decade at the 1980s annual 
average growth rate (3.7 percent) rather than its actual eleven year average for 1992-2002 of 0.7 
percent, Japan’s GDP would be 43 percent higher today.  Even at 2.5 percent growth, GDP 
would be 24 percent higher.  The only industrialized economy with a worse growth performance 
in an eleven-year period since 1945 is Switzerland. 
 
Ongoing Transformation 
The Japanese economy is in the process of fundamental transformation which will take at 
least two decades.  Such transformations are never smooth.  Japan is moving fundamentally from 
its more regulated and particularistic postwar economic system to one which is much more 
competitive and market-based.  The transformation has various dimensions.   
Agriculture has long been a neglible share of output and employment, manufacturing is 
declining gradually, and services are steadily increasing.  Production continues to shift from 
labor- intensive to capital and skilled labor- intensive, high-tech activities in manufacturing and 
especially in services, where Japanese relative productivity has been extraordinarily low 
compared to other OECD countries.   
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As domestic investment opportunities weaken over time, Japan is evolving from a high 
saving, high investing, and low consuming economy to a medium investing economy in which 
the share of saving must decrease and the share of consumption rise.  Eventually, Japan’s 
financial system will evolve from its bank deposit and lending base to a more diversified 
financial structure in which commercial paper, bonds, mutual funds, and other capital market 
financial instruments will become more important.  Labor markets, adjusting most slowly of all, 
will become less segmented and more flexible.  Demographic change may not have much 
economic impact for the next ten years, but after that it will become increasingly important.  
Those over 65 are becoming a steadily larger share of the population.  On the other hand, the 
younger generation will embody new lifestyles, values, and technological capabilities to utilize 
the Internet and other attributes of information technology.  The government’s unwillingness to 
address Japan’s fundamental economic problems means that growth in 2003, and probably for 
several years to come, will continue to be substantially below its potential rate.   
 
Financial System Fragility Persists 
One of the biggest disappointments has been the government’s lack of political will to 
tackle financial system problems.  The most important instance, both substantively and 
symbolically, is the bank non-performing loan (NPL) problem.  The government was able to 
avoid a financial crisis prior to the March 31, 2002 annual settling of accounts and the September 
interim settling for financial institutions and most corporations, but fundamental problems 
persist.  These include the fragility of bank capital; the steady weakening of life insurance 
companies, coupled with their double gearing with related major banks (each provides capital 
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and lends to the other); and the delay to 2005 in the scheduled final termination of the 
government unlimited guarantee of bank demand deposits. 
 The government’s three basic financial system principles, implemented by the Financial 
Services Agency (FSA), are to continue to pursue financial reform, to avoid financial crises, and 
to refrain from injecting any further government funds as bank capital.  In normal times these 
principles are compatible, but these are not normal times.  The government cannot solve the NPL 
problem, the key to bank reform, without providing more funds, directly or indirectly. 
 While technically well meeting the risk-weighted minimum 8 percent capital adequacy 
requirements, the quality of bank capital is problematic even if their non-performing loan 
projections and loss provisions are accurate.  Of the major bank core capital base of ¥17.5 trillion 
($152 billion, 115 yen per dollar), ¥8.4 trillion is based on deferred tax assets against presumed 
future profits and ¥6 trillion on preferred shares owned by the government and supposed to be 
redeemed.  The huge surge of the deferred tax assets is fundamentally a consequence of quite 
restrictive Japanese tax treatment of bank loan loss reserves.  Unlike the United States or other 
countries, Japanese banks cannot deduct as an expense additions to loan loss reserves until the 
borrower has essentially declared bankruptcy.  Inevitably, in such a tax system, not desirable in 
my view, banks build up deferred tax credits that can be realized against operating profits (which 
in fact banks do have) only after the loan write-off procedures are completed, while the 
government collects taxes currently rather than later. 
Even so, the greatest problem continues to lie in the estimates and projections of non-
performing loans.  Furthermore, this is after the massive bank write-offs of some ¥81.5 trillion 
($709 billion) since 1992, including ¥9.7 trillion ($84 billion) this past year (fiscal 2001); the 
major bank write-offs alone amounted to ¥7.7 billion, almost double their previous year’s write-
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offs of ¥ 4.3 trillion.  Significantly, bank estimated cumulative new NPLs since 1993 are even 
greater than loan losses taken or provisioned against. 
 The estimates of bank non-performing loans continue to be controversial.  As of March 
30, 2002 bank estimates of their NPLs totaled ¥43.2 trillion ($376 billion); the major bank NPLs 
stood at ¥28.4 trillion.  FSA estimation procedures have tightened, and on November 10 Minister 
Takenaka announced that the major bank NPLs amounted to ¥47 trillion, rather than the end 
September interim estimate of ¥34 trillion.  Even this revision is a lower bound.  While 
substandard, most NPLs are backed by collateral to some degree; nonetheless potential losses 
could devastate bank capital, and eventually almost surely will, unless new capital is injected. In 
economic terms, the capital of most banks is far below the minimum adequacy requirements. 
 Bank capital is subject to two further risks.  One is a decline in the market value of the 
shares banks hold in other companies, an amount considerably larger than their own capital.  
Under the mark-to-market rule, banks have to subtract from capital any losses over the yearly 
period (and of course add any gains).  Banks have been selling shares in the market, and soon 
will be selling some shares directly to the Bank of Japan, so they have reduced their risk 
exposure.  While last summer a Topix stock index of 800 was the point at which bank capital 
would be below 8 percent, a recent estimate is that the banks can cope with stock price declines 
to a Topix of 650.  Nonetheless, stock price levels will be one danger signal for banks at fiscal 
year-end (March 2003). 
The second is the danger of possible further life insurance company collapses.  The life 
insurance companies have been caught in a squeeze between the interest rates earlier guaranteed 
to policyholders and the much lower yields they are able to earn on their assets.  Seven 
companies have already been forced into bankruptcy.  Major banks have provided the equivalent 
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of capital and made loans to affiliated life insurance companies, which in turn have subscribed to 
bank preferred shares and subordinated bonds.  Each is at risk of the failure of the other.  The 
government’s Financial System Council is now studying the possibility of reducing guaranteed 
yields on existing insurance contracts, essential for the survival of many of the remaining life 
insurance companies.   
 The future of Japanese banks appears bleak even in the near-term.  Operating profits for 
fiscal 2002 will almost surely be lower than bad loan disposals.  So long as deflation and very 
slow economic growth persist, bank profits probably will not be sufficient to cover loan losses, 
and banks will weaken further.  Even when deflation ends, until interest rate spreads widen 
banks cannot generate substantial profits.  More importantly, banks still lack a strong credit 
culture, i.e. the ability and willingness to differentiate interest rates on loans by borrower 
creditworthiness.  At the operating level, loan officers presently seem to be risk averse, 
preferring not to make loans rather than to raise interest rates for small and medium-sized 
corporate borrowers.  Bank management has a strong personal incentive not to dispose of NPLs 
at the pace and in the amounts needed because that will require the injection of government 
funds, the political quid pro quo for which they will lose their jobs. 
 The other side of the NPL coin is what to do about the borrowers, namely the weak but 
very large companies unable to service their bank loans.  In many respects their restructuring or 
liquidation, while essential, creates more fundamental problems: laid off workers; disposal of 
assets; and the writing off of the NPLs (debt forgiveness, debt-equity swaps) which will severely 
hurt the creditor bank balance sheets.  The loan exposure of individual banks to certain major 
clients is huge.  Banks cannot afford to finance the restructuring of a half a dozen or so of these 
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clients at the same time, which is why the banks and the FSA have persisted in an incremental, 
sequential, drawn-out approach. 
 Prime Minister Koizumi and other politicians faced an unpalatable choice between 
delaying the pay-off further or facing the real risk of a banking crisis as depositors move funds 
out of financially weak banks, especially smaller but politically powerful local and regional 
banking institut ions.  Koizumi decided to delay the termination of large-sized ordinary deposit 
guarantees until April 1, 2005, an implicit recognition of the fragility of the financial system and 
failure of financial reform policies.  Worse, the Diet has just passed the government unlimited 
guarantee, non- interest-bearing deposit accounts for settlement (transactions) purposes on a 
permanent basis.  This opens a potentially huge loophole and creates further moral hazard 
problems. 
 
The Takenaka Financial Revitalization Program  
It is very difficult for an outsider to know and understand well the fundamental strategy, 
much less the tactics, in announcing and implementing the Takenaka program for financial 
revival in October.  Japanese policymaking is probably even more opaque and complex than in 
other democracies.  Many Americans tend to be somewhat naively optimistic, and expectations 
were raised that real progress in banking reform would be forthcoming in the September 30 
Cabinet reshuffle installing Heizo Takenaka as FSA Minister and his appointment of an 
independent, strong committee to prepare and report quickly a financial revival program.  The 
complete implementation of the final program as it now stands is key, but that is an ongoing 
process with many of the specific measures yet to be defined, so one can make only an interim 
evaluation. 
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 The Takenaka program, as initially leaked, was extraordinarily bold and strong.  In as 
much as Takenaka has no political power base, clearly its implementation required not only 
Prime Minister Koizumi’s initial approval but his ongoing, supportive involvement in the tough 
political negotiations among the LDP, the government bureaucrats at FSA and other relevant 
Ministries, and major bank top management.  However, follow-up support of his bold policy 
proposals has not been Koizumi’s style, and apparently it did not occur in the intense 
negotiations over the initial Takenaka proposal.  The final result was a substantially weakened 
version, only further seemingly incremental steps in resolving the bank non-performing loan and 
capital inadequacy problems.  Only time will tell whether the implementation of the new policies 
announced on October 30 will be effective and adequate. 
 
 I derive several lessons from the ongoing evolution of the Takenaka program.   
First, the government is not yet prepared to initiate sufficiently strong bank reform 
measures that government funds would have to be injected directly as bank capital; the provision 
of government funds would both arouse the ire of the public and require bank top management to 
resign.  Takenaka has recently announced that no banks will be nationalized.  The hope, 
unrealistic in my view, remains among policymakers that the policy of very gradual reforms and 
improvement will eventually succeed. 
 Second, nonetheless the FSA is increasing its pressure on the banks.  These include 
stricter guidelines for bank supervision, evaluation of loan riskiness, importantly the application 
of the discounted cash flow method for such valuations, reduction of inconsistencies among 
banks in their differential evaluation of loans to the same borrower, and related measures.  A key 
issue is whether the actual implementation of the various new policies will be sufficiently severe 
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as to create conditions requiring government capital injection in order to prevent a financial 
crisis.  That now seems unlikely.  As of now, only some financial market crisis is likely to 
precipitate stronger, more robust financial reform by the government.  
 Third, the government nonetheless will seek indirect means to help refinance the banks 
by somehow buying their non-performing loans at higher than present, inevitably low, market 
prices, namely at net book value (face value minus any loan loss reserves).  This will be done 
through the RCC for NPLs of firms in or near bankruptcy (categories 3 and 4) and by a new 
agency, the Industrial Revitalization Organization (IRO), which will buy from banks the dubious 
(category 2) loans of major industrial corporations that are deemed to be viable.   
Fourth, the establishment of the IRO represents an explicit recognition that even more 
serious than the bank NPL problem is the restructuring of those companies with non-performing 
assets unable to generate sufficient cash flow to repay their borrowings on schedule.  The IRO is 
potentially a major positive step, but at the same time potentially dangerous if political 
intervention and moral hazard issues seriously impede its effectiveness.  Key issues are whether 
the public will accept this indirect infusion of government funds into banks, and more 
importantly, determination of the criteria and procedures by which companies are deemed viable 
and hence worthy of joint IRO – main bank assistance.  The conditions necessary to make 
effective are tough, and it is premature to judge whether the IRO will be effective. 
Fifth, the Takenaka plan episode has nonetheless significantly changed the nature of the 
policy debate within Japan and moved it forward.  With the more widespread recognition of the 
size and importance of deferred tax credits as a major component of bank capital has come 
increased understanding that the banks really are in deep trouble.  When the time comes the 
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public may be more receptive to the infusion of government capital funds by one means or 
another. 
 Sixth, for the first time a potentially effective coalition of major economic policymaking 
government institutions seems to be coalescing.  That is essential, since the implementation of a 
coordinated combination of financial and economic reform policies is necessary.  These include 
the FSA, the Bank of Japan, the Council for Economic and Fiscal Policy, the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, and especially the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), which apparently is sending some of its most able staff 
to the Industrial Revitalization Organization.  The Bank of Japan deserves major credit for 
initiating this process with its September 18 announcement that it would purchase excess equities 
directly from banks for purposes of financial system stability.  This had a significant 
psychological and political impact that set the current policy process in motion, even though the 
direct economic impact of such purchases will be modest. 
 The set of Takenaka proposals finally agreed upon have set in motion a process that in 
principle is gradual in approach.  However, given the fragile condition of the banking system, it 
may well turn out that a crisis, or a sense of crisis, erupts before the fiscal year end (March 30, 
2003), which will require more forceful government action. 
 This episode has reinforced my view that the ending of deflationary expectations and 
near-term aggressive aggregate demand stimulus are more essential than ever, and should now be 
the highest priority.  Restructuring and readjustment and its costs will be substantially less severe 
if the economy were to grow fairly well over the next two years, and deflationary expectations 
replaced by modest reflationary expectations.  Since the 2002 economic recovery is now slowing 
down, and the world economic outlook is somewhat cautious, policymakers will have to be even 
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more vigorous in aggregate demand stimulus.  The proposed fiscal 2002 supplementary budget 
of ¥6.2 trillion, of which ¥4.2 trillion is in expenditures, is only a modest step forward; it should 
be substantially larger since this direct stimulus effect will be less than one percent of GDP.  
However, I am not optimistic that policymakers will take sufficiently stimulative aggregate 
demand policies in the near future. 
 The next few months will be witness to increased pressures on the banking system and on 
government policies, with fiscal year-end March 30, 2003 looming.  Governor Hayami’s term 
expires by then, and soon the Prime Minister will have to decide upon a new Bank of Japan 
governor.  By March the concrete policies, rules, and programs of the newly-established 
Industrial Revitalization Commission will have to be determined.  While initial financial market 
reactions have been somewhat positive (almost everyone prefers policy postponement to hard 
landings), it is unclear how markets will react in the months ahead as the Takenaka reform 
process unfolds.   
 
Japan’s Fundamental Macro Problem: Excess Saving 
Put simply, excess private saving is the fundamental cause of Japan’s current 
extraordinary macroeconomic situation of inadequate aggregate demand, deflation, 
unprecedented monetary ease with zero short-term interest rates and excess liquidity, a 
continuing general government budget deficit on the order of 6 percent annually, and a gross 
government debt in excess of 140 percent of GDP (though most is held by the government , 
government-related institutions, and the Bank of Japan).  The excess of private domestic saving 
over private domestic investment is one of Japan’s most important structural problems; it shows 
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up as lack of aggregate demand and a huge saving- investment gap.  Once this gap ends, all other 
macroeconomic difficulties will substantially ease.   
Unfortunately, Japan’s stimulative monetary and fiscal policies have been insufficient; 
the gap has simply been too large.  And, given the decline in profitability (return on assets) and 
future growth prospects, business investment is likely to be a substantially smaller share of GDP 
– a share more like that seen in comparably wealthy industrial countries in the West.  The 
Japanese GDP structure has to shift from its high saving, high investment, and low consumption 
pattern to moderate saving and a higher share of consumption to accommodate a more moderate 
investment rate.  Reduction of barriers that currently inhibit effective competition, greater market 
flexibility, and other deregulatory and structural reforms will increase business investment 
opportunities, and in the long run the household saving rate will continue to decline.  However, 
all that takes time; it is one important element of Japan’s ongoing economic transformation. 
 How can a country save too much?  After all, saving is a constructive, beneficial activity.  
It finances investment, a basic source of wealth creation.  Individuals and household save out of 
income to buy a house, to finance their consumption in retirement and old age, and for a variety 
of other specific needs.  Corporations save out of profits to invest in profitable new projects and 
other productive activities.  In an expanding economy corporations typically invest more than 
they save, utilizing the savings of individuals transferred though banks and the capital markets.    
 These are all good activities, so why and when can a nation’s saving be excessive?  The 
answer: when the nation’s savings become so large relative to investment opportunities that the 
saving cannot be utilized productively.  How can an economy close this saving – investment 
gap?  The first way is to increase profitable investment opportunities by deregulation, structural 
reforms and ongoing R & D.  Structural reform is essential for long-run growth, but it does not 
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provide the necessary quick fix for recovery from recession, and will not soon end the now-huge 
gap between potential demand and actual supply capacity, and probably never can. 
 A second approach is for the government to provide aggregate demand stimulus through 
fiscal expansion and easy monetary policy.  This is the route Japan has quite naturally pursued 
over the past decade, although somewhat reluctantly, slowly and awkwardly, with various policy 
errors.  It is noteworthy that, since 1998, government expenditures as a share of GDP have 
remained flat, and government public work and other investment activities have actually 
decreased.  The budget deficit is due to a decrease in revenues, not an increase in expenditures.  
Nonetheless, the gap between saving and investment has become so large that this aggregate 
demand stimulus, while substantial, has been inadequate to do more than ameliorate a very 
difficult situation.  In the very long run, though less soon than some project, continuously 
increasing government debt will become a severe burden.   
 In principle, there are two other ways in which an economy may resolve its excess 
savings dilemma.  One is to reduce saving by slowing GDP and income growth.  That has been 
Japan’s “solution” for the past decade.  This is an unsatisfactory outcome because of its huge 
economic and social costs.  It reflects major misperceptions and unwillingness to tackle real 
economic problems, by both government and corporate policymakers. 
 Conceptually, the remaining solution is for Japan to export its savings to countries where 
they can be better invested.  The economic mechanism for this involves an increase in net 
exports and the balance of payments current account surplus, representing Japan’s net investment 
in foreign assets.  Suppose Japan’s saving- investment gap is now on the order of 8-10 percent of 
GDP: the size of the government budget deficit plus the investment (or consumption) required to 
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restore a growth rate of 2-3 percent.  If Japan were a small economy, such as Singapore or 
Taiwan, it could run a current account surplus that large without any political backlash. 
 
 However, Japan is not a small economy; it is huge.  Its recent current account surplus of 
2-3 percent is internationally acceptable, and desirable for Japan both as demand stimulus and as 
the accumulation of foreign assets to cash in much later when domestic saving rates decline and 
retirement needs increase.  However, to generate a current account surplus of, say, 6 percent of 
GDP, (much less 8-10 percent), Japan would have to increase sharply exports of its competitive 
goods (cars, electronics, steel, ships, machinery) and even goods now not particularly 
competitive; the yen/dollar and yen/euro exchange rates would have to depreciate sharply.  Such 
a huge net export growth would not be politically acceptable to the United States or the European 
Union; their own industries would suffer too much.  So, as a large economy Japan cannot export 
its way out of its structural problems without generating massive retaliation, even though in the 




 What are the solutions to the excess saving gap if healthy growth is to be restored?  They 
combine policies aimed at the immediate twin problems of deflation and insufficient aggregate 
demand, the intermediate problem of supply-side structural reforms to create better resources 
allocation and new profitable business investment opportunities, and the long-run problem of 
increasing the share of consumption in GDP in order to sustain healthy demand. 
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 In the short run, Japan must carry out further aggregate demand stimulus in order to get 
the economy back on its normal growth path and to restore business, employee, and household 
confidence.  Only sustained economic growth will produce the conditions whereby Japan’s long-
run economic objectives can be achieved.  The Bank of Japan should provide even greater 
monetary stimulus until deflation has come to an end and growth is restored.  However, under 
present circumstances monetary policy alone is not sufficient.  Short-term fiscal stimulus is 
essential.  Given the historic tendency for wasteful, pork-barrel (political) spending on public 
works, tax cuts will probably be more effective.  Over time, as one element in the long run 
adjustment process, Japan’s tax base must be increased. 
 Structural reforms are essential to enhance business opportunities and create a more 
competitive environment, but their economic impact takes time.  The key to future growth is to 
make investment more productive and profitable, not simply to raise its share in GDP.  For more 
than a decade Japan has devoted about 15 percent of GDP to business investment, substantially 
more than the US, but has little to show for it.  Japan can generate economic growth of 2-3 
percent annually with a much more efficient pattern of business investment that requires a 
smaller share of GDP. 
 In the long run the structure of national expenditure will have to shift somewhat from 
business investment to household consumption, with a reduction in the private saving rate.  It is 
unclear how rapidly the household saving rate, which peaked in the mid-1970s and declined until 
leveling off in the 1990s, will continue to decline as the population ages.  It is also difficult to 
predict the future corporate saving rate from profits.  One implication for tax policy during this 
adjustment process is that Japan consider shifting from consumption taxes to capital (assets) 
taxes in order to reduce the incentive for households to save, and to exempt corporate dividend 
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payments from their income taxes in order to encourage greater pay-outs to shareholders, thereby 
reducing corporate saving and increasing to some degree the consumption of dividend recipients. 
 
Alternate Scenarios for the Coming Decade 
All this sounds well and good but probably is unrealistic.  What Japanese economic 
policymakers should do and what they actually will do, given political calculations, has been 
dramatically different over the past five years.  Nonetheless, eventually, perhaps gradually, they 
will have to confront more directly the macro, structural and political issues looming over them. 
I consider here four alternate economic scenarios for the coming decade, of which two 
assume gradual change, and two assume a sufficiently serious shock as to bring about substantial 
changes in economic policy and performance much more quickly.  They are: the muddling 
through (“wishful thinking”) scenario in which gradual changes eventually lead to improved 
economic performance and GDP growth of 2 percent or so; the muddling along (“setting sun”) 
scenario, of gradual decline or very little fundamental improvement, with economic growth zero, 
or 1 percent at best; the constructive shock scenario, in which a shock forces major changes in 
economic policies so as to promote structural reform and increased aggregate demand, and 
moves the economy onto a growth path of 2-3 percent; and the disastrous shock scenario, in 
which a shock leads to policymaking disarray and results in little economic improvement or even 
decline. 
One has to be careful on terminology.  The economy will inevitably suffer a series of 
modest shocks in the gradualist scenarios, but not sufficiently large to substantially alter policy 
quickly.  Analogously, we need to distinguish between small crises and major crises.  A major 
crisis by definition will bring about major policy changes.  The media use the term “collapse” 
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too frequently.  A bank may collapse, but the banking system will not; and certainly the Japanese 
economy will not collapse. 
This is not the place to go into a detailed consideration of each of these scenarios.  Like 
all projections, any evaluation is to some degree subjective.  I rank their likelihood as first, 
constructive shock, second, muddling through, third, muddling along, and lowest, disastrous 
shock.  My long-term relative optimism is based on Japan’s long-term fundamentals, which will 
eventually reassert themselves.  These include a coherent, stable society of ambitious people; 
high educational attainment; high R&D activities and capabilities; a willingness to sacrifice; a 
(now too) high saving rate; and good entrepreneurship and management. 
 
Potential Major Shocks 
 I consider here three likely sources of major shocks: Japanese domestic financial markets; 




Any of several specific events could trigger a financial crisis sufficient to force the 
government to break out of its economic policy gridlock and significantly change its economic 
policies.  One would be investor perception that a major bank has become so weak that it is 
likely to collapse.  Bearish selling of its shares would push its stock price down sufficiently that 
its depositors and other creditors flee.  Another cause could be a depositors’ shift of funds from 
weaker banks on a large scale. 
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To prevent bank runs and a panic, the government would have to activate its crisis 
management plan to inject capital directly or indirectly, take over bad loans, and possibly 
nationalize several banks (politically the least attractive alternative).  Such events would trigger a 
comprehensive strong attack on all major bank non-performing loan problems; this in turn would 
require further government capital injections and, equally importantly, the restructuring or 
liquidation of the large ailing companies with non-performing loans.  As of now, the government 
is not willing to initiate this process in order to solve the bank non-performing loan problem. 
While not likely, another possible financial event would be a sudden shift in public 
expectations from deflation to unacceptably high rates of inflation.  The Bank of Japan has 
appropriately generated a huge liquidity overhang in the financial system, reflected both in the 
extraordinarily low interest rate structure (zero interbank overnight rates) and some ¥15 trillion 
or more in excess reserves held by banks and other financial institutions in addition to their 
required reserves of some ¥4 trillion.  A major policy objective is to overcome persistent 
deflationary expectations.   
Suppose expectations – for whatever reason – shifted suddenly from deflation to 
inflation.  In the short run that would be beneficial.  Households and corporations would shift out 
of cash and deposits.  Asset prices would rise, including real estate.  The exchange rate would 
depreciate.  Purchases of goods and services would rise dramatically.  While this would be 
wonderfully beneficial if inflationary expectations were small, a shift to high inflation 
expectations would be very disruptive.  Interest rate would rise sharply and impose large capital 
losses on banks and other private holders of Japanese government bonds and other longer-term 
fixed interest rate financial assets.  Problems could arise from the sudden nature of these 
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changes, the turmoil they produced in financial and other markets, and the slowness and 
ineptitude of government policy responses. 
Another financial event, also not likely, would be widespread and extensive loss of 
confidence in the yen by Japanese households, financial institutions and foreign institutions 
which generates a massive flight from the yen into foreign currency-denominated assets or gold.  
This would precip itate a very large, market-based decline in the yen-dollar exchange rate (say to 
180 or 200).  Exports would rise sharply.  Negative foreign reactions would be very strong.  The 
government would be under great pressure to undertake the necessary economic and other 
reform measures necessary to restore confidence in the yen, and to placate the US, the EU, China 
and other Asian economies. 
 
Political Change 
Second, public dissatisfaction with the political status quo and the ongoing economic 
policy gridlock could well manifest itself in a rejection of the Liberal Democratic Party in the 
summer 2004 Lower House elections, and the likely collapse of the LDP.   
In any scenario the political landscape is likely to change a great deal over the next ten 
years, probably even more than it has in the past decade.  But the nature and form of political 
change is uncertain, and stories can be told to support either “constructive crisis” or “disastrous 
crisis” scenarios.  Various groups of reform-oriented, middle-of-the-road politicians might 
coalesce into a stable new majority party which would implement the economic, social and 
political reforms which are so crucial to Japan.  This is the political version of the “wishful 
thinking” scenario.  There are (at least) two other possible political outcomes.  One would be a 
shift to more conservative politicians and politics.  They might combine continued protection of 
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vested interests and increased government pork barrel expenditures with a major expansion of 
military expenditures.  Another scenario would be political fragmentation into many small, 
competing political parties resulting in political and policy stasis. 
 
External Shocks 
A third possibility is an external shock.  The weakening of the dollar and the US stock 
market in early summer and significantly slower-than-expected recent economic performance 
(second quarter GDP growth of only 1.1 percent annually) has raised the possibility that the US 
engine for global growth might stall in coming months, and the US might even undergo a 
double-dip recession.  That would be bad news for all economies including Japan.  However, a 
renewed US recession, and even deflation, is very low growth may be modest in 2003, but 
accelerate by early 2004. 
Japan’s most likely external shock is a sharp further depreciation of the dollar and 
appreciation of the yen.  It is important to distinguish between near-term movements and longer-
term trends.  In late July 2002 the yen had appreciated some 13 percent to about 115 yen/dollar 
from its spring low; it is now in the 120-125 range, and the Ministry of Finance would like it to 
be even weaker.  Current fundamentals are pushing for both a weak yen and a weak dollar.  
Market forces weakening the dollar have been global and stronger than those of yen weakening.  
It is unclear how the yen-dollar exchange rate will move in coming months. 
In the longer run, however, it seems unlikely that the US current account deficit in its 
balance of payments, projected to be above $475 billion (4.5 percent of GDP) in 2002 and to rise 
further in 2003, is sustainable.  As US economic performance moderates and its asset markets 
remain less attractive, foreigners are likely to become less willing to provide their savings to the 
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US.  A trade-weighted further decline of the dollar of 10-15 percent would probably be necessary 
to reduce the US current account deficit to 2-2.5 percent of GDP.  The trade effects of 
depreciation lag substantially.  The hope is that the dollar will weaken gradually, that the main 
brunt is borne by the euro, and that the yen will appreciate slowly enough to allow domestic 
adjustment to occur.  Japan cannot rely on export expansion to be a major source of domestic 
demand over the coming decade. 
But suppose the dollar depreciates suddenly and swiftly as foreigners lose confidence in 
the US market.  While the Japanese government would initially continue to resist yen 
appreciation and buy dollars, at some point it would stop resisting what had become a global 
phenomenon.  Suppose the exchange rate became 100 yen/dollar.  This would make it clear that 
there is no possibility of Japan exporting its way out of undesirably low rates of growth, or even 
recession.  In order to prevent a massive decline in confidence and in foreign demand, the 
government would be forced to take vigorous aggregate demand stimulus and economic reform 
measures. 
Since all these potential shocks are well known, why don’t Japanese policymakers do 
more now?  There are at least three reasons: lack of political will (the stalemate between the 
reformers and the status quo vested interests, the political costs of difficult decisions); wishful 
thinking (“in due course the economy will recover and grow normally on its own and deflation 
will end”); and mistaken perceptions and incorrect analysis of policy issues and policy 
instruments. 
Other shocks are less likely.  Some analysts of the muddling along (“setting sun”) 
scenario visualize unemployment eventually reaching double digits.  I consider that to be socially 
and politically unacceptable to Japanese; it would trigger major economic policy changes.  
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Fundamental changes in the external environment, such as a US retreat into unilateral 
isolationism, disintegration of the global economic and financial systems, or a heightened 




 Over the long period of its recorded history, Japan has demonstrated a tremendous 
capacity to re- invent itself politically, economically, socially, culturally.  As in all countries, 
institutions were created that served the purposes of each particular phase of Japan’s history, but 
these institutions became counterproductive as conditions and circumstances changed.  The 
essential point is that Japan, like all countries today, lives in a world of change.  Consider the 
Meiji transformation from the daimyo-based Tokugawa system; the development of a modern, 
industrial, autocratic, militaristic state prior to World War II; the emergence of a pacifist, 
democratic state which became the first postwar “economic miracle”; and the period since 1990 
in which Japan is once aga in in a difficult process of major transformation. 
 The past few years have not been easy and the next few may well be equally difficult, but 
in the longer run Japan will once again constructively and productively reinvent itself.  
 
       
